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Abstract 
Our research fleshes out econometric details of examining possible social interactions in 
labor supply. We look for a response of a person's hours worked to hours worked in the 
labor market reference group, which includes those with similar age, family structure, 
and location. We identify endogenous spillovers by instrumenting average hours worked 
in the reference group with hours worked in neighboring reference groups. Estimates of 
the canonical labor supply model indicate positive economically important spillovers for 
adult men. The estimated total wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.22, where 0.08 is the 
exogenous wage change effect and 0.14 is the social interactions effect. We demonstrate 
how ignoring or incorrectly considering social interactions can mis-estimate the labor 
supply response of tax reform by as much as 60 percent. 
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1. Introduction 
 Social interactions, defined as a response of individuals to the actions of people 
with whom they interact, may have a biological basis or stem from information gathering. 
Social interactions are a potentially important aspect of economic behavior because 
interdependencies can affect the behavioral responses of people to the expected and 
unexpected changes in their environment, including ones caused by public policy. We 
investigate the econometric nuances and empirical importance of social interactions in 
labor supply with taxes where the interdependence is a response of the individual to the 
hours worked by the members of a reference group. We find evidence of a positive 
spillover effect in hours worked that is important for tax policy, and show how ignoring 
or misinterpreting labor supply social interactions effects can lead to substantial under or 
overestimates of the labor supply effects of tax reforms.  
 There is wide-ranging evidence that people in close proximity may have a 
significant effect on the individual's decisions. Researchers have identified the presence 
of interdependence in the decisions of giving (Andreoni and Scholz 1998), voting 
(Schram and Sonnemans 1996), consumption (Sen et al. 2001, Childers and Rao 1992, 
Abu-Ismail 1992), crime (Glaeser et al. 1996), and health (Eibner and Evans 2005). 
Interdependent behavior may also present be in labor markets. There has been interest in 
social interactions in the female labor supply (Woittiez and Kapteyn 1998), young men’s 
labor supply (Weinberg et al. 2004), male labor supply with taxes (Aronsson et al. 1999), 
retirement (Hamermesh and Slemrod 2005), and job satisfaction (Hamermesh 1977, 
2001). 
 Along with evidence of social interactions, there is an equally vast literature 
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showing that the interdependence is either economically insignificant, non-existent, or 
econometrically fragile. For example, studies point out the importance of the reference 
group choice when studying teenage behavior (Kooreman and Soetevent 2002), 
cohabiting (Jacques and Chason 1978), and workplace interactions (Baker et al. 1968). 
The selection of the instrumental variables to identify social interactions can also 
dramatically change the results (Evans, Oates, and Schwab 1992). 
 The variety of interdependence studies and their conflicting conclusions underline 
that identification of social interactions is econometrically complex (Soetevent 2006). 
The first challenge a researcher needs to confront is what is the correct reference group 
(Durlauf 2004). The reference group identity issue is largely ignored due to complexity, 
with a notable exception by Woittiez and Kapteyn (1998) and Sun (2005).  
 The second challenge emerges because interdependence means that people 
respond to the behavior of others in their reference group, so we should observe 
correlated behaviors in neighborhoods, regions, or cities. However, there are other 
reasons why we may observe correlated behavior; without additional information it is 
impossible to distinguish endogenous effects from exogenous or contextual effects 
(Manski 1993).  
 The benefits of empirical social interactions research are that once the researcher 
identifies any interdependence one can perform a more complete welfare analysis. Policy 
oriented economic models can relate social interactions to health outcomes (Deaton 
2001), measurement of poverty (Pradhan 2001), or effects of taxes (Aronsson et al. 1999, 
Abel 2005). Studies suggest that improving the situation of the neighborhoods, or 
movement of individuals between neighborhoods can greatly affect the social welfare in 
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the local communities. A recent issue of the Journal of Applied Econometrics (Special 
Issue: Empirical Analysis of Social Interactions, 2003, September/October, Vol. 18, No. 
5) also presents recent applications to peer effects in colleges, social interactions in 
housing demand, and interdependence in worker's productivity. 
 Here we address many of the practical issues related to identifying the effect of 
endogenous social interactions on an individual's actions. We create a flexible measure of 
the economic distance approximating the level at which individuals interact among one 
another. We define the economic distance between individuals as a combination of 
personal characteristics and physical distance. Our measure reflects the varying costs of 
interaction as higher economic distance implies higher cost of interaction, which implies 
a lower level of interaction. We then define the reference groups, each of which consists 
of persons who are in a close economic proximity, and compute hours worked for each 
person in the reference group (endogenous social interactions). We create an instrument 
from the mean of hours worked for persons who are in the adjacent reference group to 
instrument endogenous social interactions. The specification lets us examine the core 
issue of whether the hours supplied by persons in close economic proximity are related. 
 To frame the importance of social interactions we purposely use Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics data from 1976 to anchor our research to the seminal cross-section  
studies of male labor supply by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990). Econometric 
results suggest positive and non-negligible social interactions in hours worked. The total 
wage elasticity of labor supply is 0.22, where about one-third (0.08) is due the exogenous 
wage change and about two-thirds (0.14) is due to social interaction synergies. We 
demonstrate how improperly accounting for social interactions can lead to mis-estimation 
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of the labor supply effects of tax reform by ±60 percent. 
2. Theory 
 Theories of social interactions have a long history in the economic literature. 
Since Becker (1974), the evolution of economic theory includes developing many forms 
of interactions: social norms (Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull 1999), peer-group effects 
(de Bartolome Charles 1990), neighborhood effects (Durlauf 1996), conformity effects 
(Bernheim 1994), herding (Smith and Sorensen 2000), spillovers (Roback 1982), 
contagion (Rigobon 2001), social capital (Glaeser et al. 2002, Becker and Murphy 2000), 
and positional goods (Frank 1985). In most cases the method differs according to the 
application, from an overlapping generations framework to a Bayesian learning model. 
Theoretical exercises share the common feature that the utility of the individual is 
somehow affected by either utility or choices made by members of the reference group, 
who are people with whom the individual interacts.  
 In our theoretical framework we follow Brock and Durlauf (1995) and Grodner 
and Kniesner (2006) who introduce interactions into a baseline model with additive total 
utility consisting of individual utility and social utility. We assume that the economy is in 
an equilibrium developed neighborhood structure (Durlauf 1996). In what follows we use 
the terms membership group, neighborhood, and community as equivalent and meaning 
persons who are part of the individual's reference group. 
 Consider now a general utility function that includes a negative spillover effect 
for others’ hours worked: 
                           
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, st.
,;,
gigig
ighggigigighgigigig
whc
hsbhTcubhcV
≤
−−= μμ
                         (1) 
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where ( )•igV  represents total utility of person i who belongs to the reference group g , 
( )•u  represents a private utility over consumption (c) and leisure (T – h), where T  is total 
available time, h  is hours worked/labor supplied, and ( ) ( )g h igb s hμ⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦  is total social 
disutility of working. Unlike the canonical utility function, total disutility of hours 
worked depends on the level of ( )gb • , which represents the importance of social 
disutility. For the individual i in reference group g, ( )•gb  is increasing in average hours 
worked in the reference group, hgμ , excluding the ith worker (so ( )hg i ghμ −=  ), with 
( ) 00 =gb , ( )gb ∞ →∞ , and 0gb′ > . Total social disutility also depends on ( )s • , which is 
the social disutility of individual hours worked (disutility of the individual from how 
others judge his or her work level) with ( ) 00 0s s= > , ( ) 0s ∞ → , 0s′ < , and 0s′′ > ; 0s  
is autonomous social disutility, which is equal across individuals and reference groups. 
Finally, gw  is a wage rate in the reference group g . 
 Social disutility of individual's hours worked ( )s •  is always non-zero with a 
maximum value 0s  at zero hours worked.
1 Social disutility of ones hours worked seems 
most likely to be decreasing ( )0s′ <  at a decreasing rate ( )0s′′ > . The decrease in the 
social disutility means that as individuals work more hours they believe others judge 
them less harshly. A decrease of social disutility at a decreasing rate means that as 
individuals work more hours the gain of appearing better in the eyes of peers is getting 
smaller. The worker may also view certain levels of hours worked as satisfactory and 
care less and less about opinions of others as long as the worker reaches some accepted 
levels of hours worked according to his or her personal belief system.2 
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 A typical maintained hypothesis is that the importance of the social utility term, 
b , is increasing in the average hours worked in the individual's reference group ( 0)gb′ < . 
So, when workers see that the environment is filled with other hard-working people they 
expect to be judged more if they stick out more relative to the labor market performance 
of others. The individual may feel more negatively perceived if further down the ranking 
of work effort. 
 After setting up the Lagrangian, taking the total differential of the first-order 
conditions of (1), and performing comparative statics based on the properties of social 
interactions in labor supply just described, the result emerging is that 
                                    
}( ) }( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 02h ch hh cc
dh b s
d bs h wu u w uμ
+ −
++
′ ′−
= >
′′ + − −
144424443123
                                    (2) 
with the partial derivatives of private utility, 0ccu <  and 0hhu < . 
 In equation (2) an increase in average hours worked in the reference group 
increases the individual’s hours worked. The intuition is that when the average labor 
supply increases the parameter b  increases, social disutility increases, and total utility 
decreases. To find a new maximum total utility the worker increases hours worked; 
although utility decreases because hours worked are a bad ( 0hu < ), an increase in the 
labor supply reduces social disutility because 0s′ < . Overall, an increase in hours worked 
increases total utility because the decrease in social disutility is higher than the decrease 
in individual utility. The model suggests that workers who are in an environment with a 
relatively many hard working people are induced to work more hours than when there is 
no social interactions effect.  
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 The utility function ( , ; ) [( ) / ]exp [1 ( ) /( )]ig ig ig hg ig ig igu c h h b c s b hμ β β= − − + + −% , 
where /b α β= , 2( / ( / )s s β α β= −% , α and β are parameters, and s is a linear 
combination of reference group variables ( hgμ ), is the utility function derived by 
Hausman (1980, 1981) amended to include social interactions. We will use the resulting 
linear labor supply function when examining the hypothesis that there are social 
interactions present in labor supply. In the empirical work to follow we regress 
individuals’ hours worked on average hours worked in their reference groups, cet. par. A 
positive coefficient on labor supplied by the reference group indicates the presence of a 
positive spillover effect in hours worked (Woittiez and Kapteyn 1999, Aronsson et al 
1999). We now flesh out the econometric details involved with examining social 
interactions in individual labor supply. 
3. Econometric Model 
  The canonical linear labor supply model with social interactions we estimate is 
      1 ( ) 2 ( )i g i gh x h xθ αω βυ γ δ δ ε− −= + + + + + + ,      (3) 
where ω is the after-tax real wage, υ is after-tax virtual income, x is a vector of individual 
control covariates, ( )i gh −  is reference group average labor supplied, ( )i gx −  is the vector of 
control covariate averages for the reference group, ε  is the error term, and [θ, α, β, γ, ρ, 
δ1, δ2] are parameters to estimate. 
3.1 Independent Variables 
 The net wage rate (ω ) uses a marginal tax rate τ  provided by the PSID, and is 
(1 )wω τ= − . Virtual income (υ ) also uses the marginal tax rate from the PSID.3 To 
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control for possible endogeneity when estimating (3) we instrument both the after tax 
wage and virtual income using last year's gross wage and non-labor income (Ziliak and 
Kniesner 1999). 
 The control covariates in labor supply include number of children less than six 
years old, family size, an indicator if the person is more than 45 years old, the equity the 
family has in their house, an indicator of a physical or nervous condition that limits the 
amount of work, and hours worked in the previous year in some specifications to control 
for individual heterogeneity in the cross-section. The control covariates are standard 
exogenous explanatory variables in labor supply studies. 
3.2 Social Interactions Variables 
 The mean for hours worked in the reference group is the sample average of hours 
worked for other people who are close in economic distance to the worker. In the 
computing the average we exclude the individual for whom we are computing a reference 
group mean outcome. The estimated value of the parameter 1δ  represents the effect of 
endogenous social interactions in hours worked. 
 Computing the mean of covariates takes multiple steps. First we create a proxy 
variable summarizing the information in the exogenous covariates. We then use factor 
analysis and take the first factor as a proxy variable for exogenous information. The new 
variable does not have a direct interpretation because it is standardized to have zero mean 
and unit variance, however it is highly correlated with all the exogenous variables as well 
as the individual’s hours worked. The mean in the reference group for the created proxy 
variable uses the same range of the economic distance variables as used for computing 
mean hours worked, again excluding the person for whom we are computing the 
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reference group mean. The proxy variable controls for the common characteristics of the 
reference group, and the estimated coefficient 2δ  indicates any presence of exogenous 
social interactions. 
3.3 Identifying Social Interactions 
The form of the labor supply equation in (3) can identify the presence of both 
endogenous (in the dependent variable) and exogenous (in the independent variables) 
social interactions. Identification requires some additional structure, though (Manski 
1993, Moffitt 2001). 
If the reference groups are completely separable then a randomly distributed 
shock that affects hours worked for some individuals and not others can help identify 
endogenous social interactions (Moffitt 2001). When reference groups overlap there are a 
variety of empirical approaches including repeated samples (Aronsson et al. 1999), 
structural models (Brock and Durlauf 2002, Kapteyn et al. 1997, Krauth forthcoming), 
aggregated data (Glaeser et al. 2002), within versus between variation (Graham and Hahn 
2005), or spatial econometric techniques (Kelejian and Prucha 1998). 
Alternatively, suppose there are workers who belong to more than one reference 
group, and one uses them to compute the (endogenous) mean for reference group hours 
worked. Hours worked by people in the adjacent reference group can now be an 
instrument; this is similar to using past values of the dependent variable in a dynamic 
panel data model (Arellano and Bond 1991). Here we use as an instrument the mean for 
workers in the adjacent reference groups, which are defined by a social grid with two 
social coordinates from factor analysis. The instrument is correlated with mean hours 
worked in the individual’s reference group (endogenous social interactions) because 
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people in the specific reference group and the adjacent reference group belong to the 
same economic neighborhood. The instrument should also be uncorrelated with 
unobservables affecting individual labor supply because the particular individual does not 
belong to the adjacent reference group.4 
Figure 1 illustrates our particular identification strategy. We present the 
hypothetical two-dimensional social coordinate space with two reference groups: 1g  and 
2g . Suppose now that individual 
0
1g
h  belongs to the reference group 1g  and responds to 
the outcomes of the members of the reference group, represented by the observations 
labeled as 1
1g
h  and 2
1 2g g
h  (empty and gray-filled circles). If we use the mean of all 1
1g
h  and 
2
1 2g g
h  observations (referred further as ( )0
1g
h − ) as an independent variable in the regression 
(3) to try to identify endogenous social interaction in 0
1g
h  the coefficient will be biased 
because observations 1
1g
h  and 2
1 2g g
h  are also affected by the outcome 0
1g
h , which causes 
endogeneity in the ( )0
1g
h − . However, if there are observations in the reference group 1g  that 
also belong to the neighboring reference group 2g , then part of 
( )0
1g
h −  attributed to the 
outcomes 2
1 2g g
h  can be instrumented by the outcomes of the members of the reference 
group 2g , denoted by 
3
2g
h . We can use instrumental variables (IV) estimation because 
3
2g
h  are correlated with all 2
1 2g g
h  observations because they belong to the same reference 
group, and 3
2g
h  are not correlated with the error terms associated with either 0
1g
h  or 1
1g
h  
observations because they do not belong to the same reference group. Observations 3
2g
h  
are transitorily correlated with the outcomes 0
1g
h  and 1
1g
h  only through the deterministic 
part of observations 2
1 2g g
h . 
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In practice, if we instrument observations 2
1 2g g
h  with outcomes 3
2g
h  there may still 
be observations 1
1g
h  that are not instrumented and thus will make a part of the ( )0
1g
h −  
endogenous, which is the case presented in Figure 1. Instead of using just one reference 
group we can imagine using a full set of observations in the adjacent reference groups 
that form the ring around the particular reference group (represented by the dotted circle).  
4. Data 
We use data from the University of Michigan's Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) collected in years 1975 and 1976 (PSID Wave IX). One reason for using the PSID 
is that it is the most frequently used data to study U.S. labor supply (Blundell and 
MaCurdy 1999, Ziliak and Kniesner 1999). We purposely choose the 1976 cross-section 
of the PSID data because we seek to understand how social interactions may effect labor 
supply by anchoring our estimates to the influential research of Hausman (1980, 1981) 
and MaCurdy et al. (1990) who use the same data to examine how taxes affect labor 
supply. 
4.1 Sample 
We follow the sample selection process described in Eklöf and Sacklén (2000) 
who compare the studies by Hausman (1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990) to which we 
anchor our research. Both studies estimate an almost identical linear labor supply model 
with income taxation. We select  observations according to the following criteria: married 
males 26–55 years old with positive hours worked in 1974 and 1975 (but no higher than 
5096 annual hours), who are heads of households in the cross-sectional random sub-
sample; there were no changes in the family composition of the head or wife (others can 
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change) in years 1974–1975; the head is not retired, permanently disabled, housewife, 
student, or other; the household resides in the United States; and the head is not self-
employed or a farmer. Using our exclusion criteria for the 1976 PSID we obtain 1077 
observations, which is close to the Hausman sample of 1084 and the MaCurdy sample of 
1018 as reported by Eklöf and Sacklén (2000).5 
4.2 Individual Regression Variables 
The wage rate comes from a direct question in the PSID, including an imputed 
value for workers who are not paid by the hour. We also estimate a wage equation to 
impute hourly wages for observations with unobserved or truncated wages. In particular, 
we use observations that have positive and not top-coded wage rates (839 observations) 
to estimate a Tobit regression that uses as the dependent variable observed (un)truncated 
wages on a constant term, age, age squared, years of schooling, years of schooling 
squared, college degree, and family size. We then use the estimated wage equation to 
produce a fitted value for all wages. The procedure is similar to that in Hausman (1981), 
and so our mean hourly wage is $6.17, which nearly identical to the $6.18 reported by 
Hausman. 
Hours worked, the dependent variable, also comes from a directly asked question 
in the PSID. Non-labor income is a constructed variable that is the difference between 
total 1975 taxable income of the husband and wife and total 1975 labor earnings of the 
husband. The hours worked and the non-labor income measures we use are also those of 
MaCurdy et al. (1990). Other independent variables include number of children less than 
six years old (KIDSU6), family size (FAMSIZ), an indicator variable for individuals 
more than 45 years old (AGE45), the amount of equity the family had in its house 
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(HOUSEQ), and an indicator of a physical or nervous condition that limited the amount 
of work the respondent could do (BHLTH). Appendix A presents descriptive statistics for 
all regression variables. 
4.3 Reference Group and Economic Distance 
Specifying the composition of the individual's reference group is the researcher’s 
central decision in any study of interdependence (Manski 1993, 2001). Implementing the 
reference group concept means acknowledging that people who are in relative proximity 
to each other may interact with one another because the cost of interactions is low. We 
use the concept of economic distance among individuals as an indicator of the potential 
significance and magnitude of workers’ interdependencies (Conley 1999). We take 
people who are in close economic distance as belonging to the same reference group. 
Economic distance is a combination of whether the workers are similar 
demographically and live in close physical proximity. We use a combination of personal 
and family characteristics to define demographically similar persons and use the distance 
between centers of counties in which people reside for their relative geographic locations. 
There are multiple difficulties involved with selecting from a large variety of 
characteristics to measure economic distance. Acknowledging that each characteristic 
measure has a difference scale, and determining the relative importance of each input 
variable on economic distance, we use a statistical model of factor analysis (Woittiez and 
Kapteyn 1998). The factor analytic model deals naturally with characteristics having 
different measurement scales; the procedure standardizes individual variables then fits a 
linear model to find common latent variables called factors (Bai and Ng 2002, Bai 2003). 
The intuition is that there are unobservable variables (factors) that are orthogonal to one 
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another and that are strongly correlated with observed variables. We use the factors as 
social coordinates to establish reference groups. 
 Because the typical variables explaining labor supply can affect whether workers 
interact with each other by being related to economic distance, our factor analysis inputs 
all independent variables from the econometric labor supply model (3). We also use 
physical coordinates indicating the location by the center of the county where the person 
resides. We use two factors to summarize demographic and physical coordinates because 
there is usually a much better fit with multiple factors than with only one factor, but using 
too many factors tends to be uninformative.6 By using two factors we have the 
convenient feature that the computed latent variables serve as two social coordinates 
(SocCoord1, SocCoord2) for where individuals are located on a social interactions grid 
with economic distance measured by Euclidean distance between two points. 
5. Empirical Results: Labor Supply with Social Interactions 
 Because in our study there is no clearly defined reference group we first select 
persons likely to have interdependent labor supplies by using the two social coordinates 
to define overlapping neighborhoods. The reference group now defined, we then estimate 
the labor supply model in (3) using instrumental variables for identification. Finally, we 
interpret the social interactions effects in terms of endogenous versus exogenous wage 
effects. 
5.1 Selecting the Reference Group 
 Because we do not have direct information on who belongs to the reference group 
for a particular person we use a statistical procedure to infer it from the location and 
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characteristics of the group’s members. We believe that our observations are 
representative for working married men in terms of their individual characteristics and 
spatial distribution. 
 We can think of the reference group as a ring of certain radius centered around the 
individual in two-dimensional social coordinate space (Figure 1). The problem is then to 
select the radius best representing the borders of the reference group. The borders 
selection problem is key because we use sample observations to compute the 
characteristics of close-by individuals. Each observation establishes possible multiple 
reference groups so that careful selection of borders is critical here for identification. 
 To find borders for the membership groups we use a result from spatial 
econometrics that as the reference group size expands the coefficient on endogenous 
social interactions tends to minus infinity (Kelejian and Prucha 2002).7 In our application 
endogenous social interactions are represented by the mean of hours worked by others in 
the worker's reference group, AnnHSRG_0_R, where R indicates the radius dimension of 
the reference group’s circle. If there are social interactions present at a certain size of the 
reference group, then the upward bias because of reference group labor supply 
endogeneity will overcome the statistical tendency for 1̂δ  in (3) to become negative as the 
neighborhood size increases, (Anselin 1988). The reference group with the most positive 
1̂δ  in exploratory estimates of (3) then reveals the size of the worker’s reference group.  
 In Table 1 we present results from baseline labor supply regressions with a social 
interactions variable, AnnHSRG_0_R. Estimation starts with R = 1, which means that the 
average of hours worked uses nearby workers in the social space within the distance of 
0.1 or less. When the indicator R = 1 the reference group has around 13 workers. As the 
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size of the reference group increases in the social space (the radius indicator R increases), 
the number of persons who are considered to be economically close to a worker increases 
from 44 to about 271 in Table 1. 
 As expected a priori, the coefficient on average hours worked by neighboring 
persons is increasingly negative across the columns of Table 1, going from about −0.2 to 
−1.5 as the reference group size increases. Such a tendency will be observed for any 
estimator including the IV regressions of Table 1 (Kelejian and Prucha, 2002). Critical to 
our research is that the reference group labor supply coefficient becomes positive at the 
size of the reference group where radius indicator R = 2. 
The importance of Table 1 is that the pattern of regressions reveals the group size 
with the largest upward bias due to endogeneity of the AnnHSRG variable. The 
endogeneity caused by labor supply interdependencies is most positive for the range 
(0,0.2), so we pick 0.2 as the radius most closely capturing the true size of the reference 
group. Results from a Moran I test (Anselin 2001, p. 323) confirm the presence of social 
interactions in hours worked and that the radius we adopt to define the reference group is 
reasonable. The practical consequence of our specification search is it indicates that the 
reference group contains about 44 persons, which means that it is small enough to 
guarantee sufficient variation across groups but large enough so that the computed 
average hours worked are meaningful and have relatively small error due to aggregation. 
5.2 Social interactions Effects 
 The focus of our research is on examining interdependence in hours worked using 
the canonical model of labor supply applied to cross-section data. This anchors our 
results for purposes of interpretation to the influential labor supply research of Hausman 
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(1980, 1981) and MaCurdy et al. (1990). 
 We first confirm that our estimates for the uncompensated wage and income 
elasticities are similar to the results of Hausman and MaCurdy et al. The first column of 
Table 2 presents IV regression wage and income coefficients for their canonical models 
of labor supply. The uncompensated wage elasticity at the means is 0.14 and the income 
elasticity at the means is −.008; both values are typical estimates in the econometric labor 
supply literature that serves as our starting point for judging the importance of social 
interactions. 
 Our focal regression results are presented in column two of Table 2, where we 
add past hours worked as a simple control for additional person-specific heterogeneity 
and hours worked in the reference group as reflecting social interactions. We also use as a 
regressor the average of the proxy variable for the exogenous variables constructed via 
factor analysis (IndVORG_2_6). The estimated social interactions effect is that a 10 
hours increase in the reference group labor supplied would increase individual's hours 
worked by about 6 hours. The estimated social interaction effect in column two of Table 
2 is significant statistically and economically reasonable in magnitude.8 
 It is important to re-emphasize that the estimated social interactions effect, 1̂δ , 
which is the impact of average hours worked by persons in the worker's reference group 
(AnnHSRG_0_2), has the expected sign and magnitude only after the interdependence 
has been instrumented, which we do in Table 2. The results in Table 1 are inconsistent 
because they suggest the presence of endogenous social interactions (Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test rejects exogeneity at the 5 percent level). Because of the difference 
between the results in Tables 1 and 2 we need to emphasize the method we use to 
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construct the instrument for social interactions in labor supply. 
 As noted, there are no obvious variables to provide exogenous variation with 
which to instrument reference group work effort, so we use the structure of the data to 
construct an instrument for the reference group’s labor supplied. Taking reference groups 
as overlapping with boundaries as fixed, average hours worked by persons in the adjacent 
reference groups can be instruments. The outer boundary of the persons for the 
instrument group will be exactly twice the size of the radius for each neighborhood 
because there may be workers who are located exactly on the boundary for both the 
reference group of interest and the adjacent reference group.9 We construct hours worked 
by individuals in the outside ring in Figure 1, (0.2, 0.6], which has an average of 226 
observations for each instrument group. First-stage goodness of fit and Sargan test results 
for the regressions in Table 2 confirm that our instruments (for all three right-hand side 
endogenous regressors) are valid in terms of passing the standard checks for weak 
instruments and that the overidentifying restrictions are satisfied. 
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 In is instructive to examine how our results may or may not be robust to the sizes 
of the reference group or adjacent groups comprising the instrument set. How might our 
results change by (1) shrinking the outer circle boundary in Figure 1, which leaves the 
reference group size the same but decreases the number of observations viewed as nearest 
neighbors for the reference group, or change by (2) shrinking the inner reference group 
circle boundary in Figure 1, which makes the reference group smaller? 
In the first sensitivity experiment, as the instrument group shrinks the IV 
estimated social interactions effect is similar while becoming statistically less precisely 
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estimated. Our interpretation is that the instrument loses power as the size of the 
instrument set shrinks. 
In the second sensitivity experiment, we find that when the reference group size 
shrinks the estimated social interactions effect is again basically unchanged although 
statistical efficiency of the estimate again decreases. We interpret the result of the second 
sensitivity experiment as indicating that the range for the reference group is well chosen 
because within the group there should be a similar level of interactions, and we are  just 
choosing a progressively smaller and small subgroup who still interact. 
 Having discussed the sensitivity of our results instrument construction we now 
turn our attention to the economic interpretation and policy implications of our estimated 
social interactions effects in male labor supply. 
5.4 Interpreting the Importance of the Estimated Social Interactions Effect  
 The presence of social interactions in labor supply means that individuals respond 
to others’ hours worked by a non-negligible amount. A social interactions effect is  
important because policy affecting the wages or another independent variable of a 
subgroup will not only affect the individual but also affect others in the reference group. 
We therefore focus on the direct versus the indirect effect of interdependence. In 
particular, we study the consequences of interdependence for the estimated effect of 
wages on labor supply, which economists use widely in welfare effect simulations of tax 
reform proposals. 
 Taking the mean values in equation (3) and focusing on hours worked and wages, 
                                       1
1
1
1
h h hαω δ α ω
δ
= + ⇒ =
−
,                                       (4) 
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where the quantity ( )11/ 1 δ−  is known as the global social multiplier because it 
represents the effect of social interactions at the highest level of aggregation (Glaeser et 
al. 2003). The total effect of a wage change can be decomposed into 
                                          1
1 1
/
1 1
h αδαω α
δ δ
∂ ∂ = = +
− −
,                                          (5) 
where α is the exogenous effect, and ( ) ( )1 1/ 1αδ δ−  is the endogenous effect. Notice that 
the endogenous effect depends on both the magnitude of the initial exogenous change and 
the social multiplier. 
 Multiplying equation (5) by / hω  the uncompensated elasticity is 
                                      , , ,hw total hw exogenous hw endogenousη η η= + ,                                      (6) 
where , /hw exogenous hη αω=  and ( ), 1 1/ 1hw endogenous hη αδ ω δ= − . For 1 0.5δ <  the exogenous 
effect is larger than the endogenous effect, but for 1 0.5δ >  the endogenous effect is 
larger. As we will later emphasize, the decomposition in (6) underscores how ignoring 
labor supply interdependencies may have serious consequences for the elasticity 
estimates of interest. 
 Using the values from column two of Table 2, the total uncompensated wage 
elasticity of labor supply at the means is 0.22, with an exogenous part of 0.08, and a 
endogenous part of 0.14. In comparison, the baseline model results from column one of 
Table 2 are an uncompensated net wage elasticity of 0.13. When we purposely ignore 
social interactions the estimated exogenous wage effect is about 60 percent too high; the 
positive bias in the canonical model happens because the single (wage) coefficient 
estimate also imbeds the effect of labor supply interdependencies. The twin findings that 
(1) the wage elasticity has two unequal and sizeable parts in the social interactions model 
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and that (2) the wage coefficient of the traditional model has sizeable omitted variable 
bias have important consequences for evaluating tax policy. 
5.5 Implications for Tax Policy Calculations 
 Theoretical solutions to optimal static or dynamic taxation in the presence of 
social interactions externalities use the parameters of the utility and attendant 
consumption and labor supply functions (Kooreman and Schoonbeek 2004, Abel 2005). 
Our research clarifies the econometric subtleties of implementing labor supply models 
with spillover effects and then presents econometric estimates of the importance of social 
interactions in labor supply. Our most basic results are that U.S. male labor supply data 
(1) reject a model ignoring social interactions against one with spillovers and (2) reject a 
model with spillovers treated as exogenous against one with spillovers treated as 
endogenous. A regression model that ignores spillovers in labor supply underestimates 
the wage elasticity of labor supply by about 40 percent; if one uses a social interactions 
model but ignores endogenous interactions one underestimates the wage elasticity by 
over 60 percent. 
 It is less obvious how we should apply estimates that let the policy-maker 
apportion the total wage elasticity into segments with and without social interactions. 
Some back-of-the-envelope calculations for the proportional tax rate case are instructive. 
Results from the preferred model in Table 2, column 2, are that a 10 percent 
comprehensive tax rate cut would raise male labor supply by as much as 2.2 percent 
when social interactions are considered; ignoring social interactions would lead to about a 
60 percent under-estimate of the labor supply effect of the tax cut (0.8 percent). Less well 
established is how to use in policy calculations our decomposition of the total wage 
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elasticity into its exogenous component (+0.08) and its endogenous social interactions 
component (+0.14). 
 To flesh out the enriched implications of a labor supply model with social 
interactions let us consider some of the details of a proportional tax reduction applied to 
married men in a case where one need be careful with potential social interactions effects. 
Suppose the proportional tax rate change applied only to families with disabled children. 
The subpopulation affected would be relatively small and scattered geographically; the 
reference group effects could be ignored safely, and the appropriate elasticity to use 
would be closer to 0.08 than to 0.22. Alternatively, suppose we were discussing the effect 
of a proportional state income tax change on the highest earners in a state such as 
California, where many would live in the same area. Now feedback effects would be 
present. The elasticity to use would then include non-negligible social interactions effects 
and would probably be closer to 0.22 than to 0.08. 
 The importance of gauging what is the correct elasticity in terms of the exogenous 
and endogenous parts is only useful if we can define whether or not a particular group 
will be affected by interactions. If the persons who are affected do not belong to the same 
reference group then most likely we would only observe the exogenous effect, and the 
elasticity would overestimated if we used an elasticity that contained both exogenous and 
endogenous components, which was the first example in the last paragraph. If the tax 
reform applied to members of a reference group, though, then there would be a full-
blown feedback effect and the elasticity that used only an exogenous component would 
underestimate the total labor supply effect, which was the second example above. 
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6. Conclusion 
 Our research uses the canonical model of labor supply that adds possible social 
interactions in hours worked. We flesh out the econometric nuances of testing whether an 
increase in hours worked by the members of the reference group increases hours worked 
for the individual (endogenous social effect). The reference group here contains persons 
in close economic distance to each other. Our measure of economic distance uses factor 
analysis, which allows mapping neighborhood variables into a two-dimensional social 
space. Our identification strategy builds on the likelihood that some persons belong to 
more than one reference group so that their hours worked may be used to instrument for 
endogenous labor supply of individuals in the worker’s reference group. 
 In our regression model of married men’s labor supply if social interactions are 
treated as exogenous there is no estimated effect of the reference group behavior on the 
individual worker's behavior. When we instrument mean hours worked of the reference 
group we find a social interactions effect that is significant both statistically and 
economically. The estimated total wage elasticity of labor is 0.22, where about one-third 
is due to the exogenous wage change and two-thirds is due to social interactions effects. 
 The policy implications are that if one is to understand fully the labor supply and 
welfare effects of income taxes, which may be conditioned on demographic and location 
information, a model including social interactions is best. Equally important is a proper 
interpretation of the social interactions model results. We demonstrate how a mis-
specified model or a properly specified model that is mis-interpreted can easily lead to 
mis-estimates of the labor supply effects of tax reform by as much as 60 percent.
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Endnotes 
 
1.  The baseline level of social disutility 0s  is exogenous, and we begin by assuming 
 that it is constant for all individuals across all groups. Homogeneity is important 
 because if 0s  varies either across individuals due to  heterogeneity or across the 
 groups due to reference-group specific characteristics, then it is impossible to 
 discuss the effect of social utility ( )b •  versus the effect of autonomous social 
 utility 0s . 
2.  The overall result here would not change if 0s′′ < . 
3.  υ = [NLI + (τ – (TT/(TI – NLI)) × (TI – NLI))], where NLI is non-labor income, 
 TT are total taxes, and TI is taxable income (Ziliak and Kniesner 1999).   
4. A strategy similar to ours just described is in Case and Katz (1992), who 
instrument for the endogenous effect using the average levels of adjacent 
neighbors’ characteristics that are supposedly exogenous. Similarly, Evans et al. 
(1992) instrument school composition with city-wide variables for the 
unemployment rate. 
5. The difference between the number of observations used by MaCurdy et al. 
(1990) and our study comes from the fact that we dropped two observations 
because the head’s age was missing and that we did not exclude persons who 
were self-employed and farmers in 1975 but not in 1976 (changed employment 
status). Due to restricting the sample to individuals who also reported hours 
worked for year 1974, we have a final sample of 910 men. 
6.  The first factor loads primarily on demographics and explains about 75 percent of 
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the total variation in the variables. The second (rotated) factor loads primarily on 
location and then explains about 15 percent of the information. 
7.  The intuition behind the result is that as the size of the group used to produce the 
average grows it approaches a similar value for everyone and become 
increasingly collinear with the regression constant term.  
8.  The coefficient on the hours worked for the reference group needs to be less than 
1.0 here. Otherwise, a one hour increase in the mean hours worked for the 
reference group would induce a worker to increase his labor supply by more than 
one hour, which in turn would increase the hours worked for other men in the 
individual's reference group even further. The labor market equilibrium would be 
explosive, and a small positive shock to hours worked for any individual in the 
reference group would cause a domino effect where in the limit all workers 
choose the maximum feasible hours. 
9.  The result stems from symmetric boundaries around each member. We thank Dan 
 Black for that observation. 
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Table 1. Selection of the Reference Group Using IV Regression 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 AnnualHours AnnualHours AnnualHours AnnualHours AnnualHours AnnualHours 
AfterTaxWage 52.5361 68.4734* 71.6107** 71.8010** 68.8683* 68.9533* 
 (36.3663) (35.9633) (35.4610) (35.8352) (35.6676) (35.4563) 
VirtualInc −0.0034 −0.0031 −0.0040 −0.0047 −0.0051 −0.0055 
 (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0057) 
AnnHSRG_0_1 −0.1978**      
 (0.0867)      
AnnHSRG_0_2  0.0626     
  (0.1432)     
AnnHSRG_0_3   −0.2042    
   (0.2411)    
AnnHSRG_0_4    −0.4982   
    (0.3231)   
AnnHSRG_0_5     −0.9685***  
     (0.3566)  
AnnHSRG_0_6      −1.5021*** 
      (0.4709) 
Observations 879 910 918 922 922 922 
Average obs in 
ref group 13.33 44.53 89.19 142.56 204.13 271.21 
Identifying 
Instruments 
WageRate75, 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75, 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75, 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75, 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75, 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75, 
NLIncome75 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Endogenous variables’ coefficients in bold. Weak instrument check statistics appear in Table 2. 
Additional Control Variables: KIDSU6, FAMSIZ, AGE45, HOUSEQ, BHLTH, Constant 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 2. IV Regressions with Social Interactions  
 
Dependent Var: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Annual Hours 
Worked 
Baseline Full Only 
heterogeneity 
Only social 
interactions 
AfterTaxWage 66.6982* 38.5373 30.5734 81.6429** 
 (35.5604) (28.6798) (28.1246) (37.3766) 
VirtualInc −0.0031 0.0000 0.0011 −0.0055 
 (0.0058) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0061) 
IndVRG_0_2 −318.8201 −317.4740 −284.0008 −385.0609 
 (381.9788) (307.9343) (302.0874) (401.1535) 
AnnHSRG_0_2  0.6379**  1.3128*** 
  (0.2689)  (0.3532) 
Observations 910 910 910 910 
Sargan test   0.212  0.081 
P-value  0.645  0.776 
Identifying 
Instruments 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
AnnHSORG_2_6 
IndVORG_2_6 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
WageRate75 
NLIncome75 
AnnHSORG_2_6 
IndVORG_2_6 
Standard errors in parentheses 
Endogenous variables’ coefficients in bold. F(Shea partial R2) = 53.0(0.189), 368.1(0.621), 51.9(0.188)   
Additional control variables in all equation: KIDSU6, FAMSIZ, AGE45, HOUSEQ, BHLTH, Constant 
Additional control variable in (2) and (3): AnnualHours75  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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 Figure 1. Demonstration of the Identification Strategy for the Endogenous Social Interactions. 
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Appendix A. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
 
AnnualHours 910 2236.864000 536.701100 288.000000 4917.000000 
AnnualHour75 910 2247.385000 540.086500 320.000000 4500.000000 
AfterTaxWage 910 4.692693 1.198573 0.542700 7.488000 
WageRate 910 6.272303 1.794132 0.670000 9.900000 
WageRate75 910 5.479915 0.636453 3.655642 6.837162 
VirtualInc 910 5138.557000 4364.210000 −965.000000 45593.000000 
NLIncome 910 3710.268000 4700.172000 −7900.000000 57640.000000 
NLIncome75 910 3298.155000 3984.506000 −10000.000000 26000.000000 
AnnHSRG_0_2  910 2210.108000 134.322300 1180.000000 2950.667000 
AnnHSORG_2_6  910 2214.600000 53.725650 2009.458000 2477.579000 
IndVORG_2_6  910 301892.000000 5444115.000000 −1.534880 1.369547 
IndVRG_0_2  910 352303.000000 0.035230 −1.760330 1.598270 
KIDSU6  910 0.445055 0.696331 0.000000 3.000000 
FAMSIZ  910 3.873626 3.873626 2.000000 9.000000 
AGE45  910 1.748352 3.108485 0.000000 11.000000 
HOUSEQ 910 18511.900000 16930.990000 −5000.000000 120000.000000 
BHLTH 910 .051648 .221438 0.000000 1.000000 
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